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QUINTAL tI. LAUREL GROVE HOSPITAL

[62 C.2d
t.

[So F. No. 21771. In Bank. Dec. 14,1964.]

REGINALD J. QUINTAL, a Minor, etc., et a1., Plaintiffs
and Appellants, V. LAUREL GROVE HOSPITAL et a1.,
Defendants and Respondents.
[1] Judgments - Judgment Notwithstanding Verdict - When
Granted.-A motion for judgment notwithstanding a verdict
for plaintiff may properly be granted only when, disregarding
conflicting evidence and indulging in every inference in plaintiff's favor, the result is a determination that there is no
evidence of substantial nature to support the verdict.
[2] Id.-Judgment Notwithstanding Verdict-Hearing: Review.On a motion for judgment notwithstanding a verdict for
plaintiff, the trial court is not permitted to weigh the evidence;
on an appeal from the judgment entered on granting such
motion, th-e appellate court must read the record in the light
most advantageous to plaintiff, resolve all conflicts in his
favor, and give him the benefit of all reasonable inferences
in support of the judgment.
[3] Physicians-Malpractice-Standard of Care and Skill.-Medical specialists are held to that standard of learning and skill
normally possessed by such specialists in the same or similar
locality under the same or similar circumstances.
[4] Id.-Malpractice-Actions-Questions for JUr)'.-In a malpractice suit based on a 6-year-old boy's being mute, blind,
and a spastic quadriplegic as a result of a cardiac arrest
during administration of an anesthetic, the evidence was sufficient to go to the jury on the question of two doctors' negligence, where there was testimony to the effect that if due care
is used a cardiac arrest does not ordinarily occur, where it
appeared that on the morning of the operation the boy was
very apprehensive and had a fever, both being danger signals,
and where there was some expert testimony from which the
jury could infer that proper care required that one of the
doctors, an ophthalmologist, either should have performed a

,

[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Judgments, § 45; Am.Jur., Judgments (rev
ed § 297).
[3] See CaI.Jur.2d, Physicians, Dentists, and Other Healers of
the Sick, § 76; Am.Jur., Physicians and Surgeons (1st ed § 90).
Melt. Dig. References: [1] Judgments, § 113(1); [2J Judgments,
§§ 113(4), 113(5); [3] Physicians, § 51(3); [4] Physicians, § 57;
[5) Physicians, § 59; [6, 8] Negligence, § 133(1); [7) Negligence,
§ 142; [9] Hospitals, § 20; [10] New Trial, § 99.
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thoracotomy or should have taken steps to have someone
present to perform sueh operation.
[6] Id.-Malpractice-Actions-Instructions. - In a malpractice
suit based on a 6-year-old boy's being mute, blind, and a
spastic quadriplegic as a result of a cardiac arrest during
administration of an anesthetic, where it appeared that res
ipsa loquitur applied if the jury could find certain facts which
they were entitled to find from the evidence, but where there
was also evidence that the injury could occur without negligence, the jury should be instructed that if they find certain
facts to be true they should apply the inference involved in
res ipsa loquitur.
[6] Negligence-Res Ipsa Loquitnr-When Doctrine Applies.Generally, res ipsa loquitur applies when the accident is of
such a nature that it can be said, in the light of past experience, that it probably was the result of negligence by someone and that defendant is probably the person who is
responsible.
[7] Id.-Evidence-Circumstantial Evidence.-Negligence and connecting defendant with it, like other facts, can bl' proved by
circumstantial evidence. There does not have to be an eyewitness, nor need there be direct evidence of defendant's
conduct, and there is no absolute requirement that plaintiff
explain how the accident happened.
[8] Id.-Res Ipsa Loquitur-When Doctrine Applies.-Res ipsa
loquitur may apply where the cause of injury is a mystery,
if there is a reasonable and logical inference that defendant
was negligent and that such negligence caused the injury.
[9] Hospitals-Actions-Questions for Jury. - In a malpractice
suit against a hospital and an anesthesiologist based on a 6year-old boy's being mute, blind, and a spastic quadriplegic
as a result of a cardiac arrest during administration of an
anesthetic, where the anesthesiologist testified that he had an
active part in the management of the hospital and that as
acting administrator he came to an agreement with the
group of anesthesiologists with whom he was connected to
furnish a proper anesthesiologist on demand of the hospital,
where the hospital furnished the nurses who attended the boy
and the op-erating room nurses, together with all equipment
used by th~ anesthesiologist, and where the boy's mother, as
required by the hospital officials, signed an "Authority to
Operate," the question of agency for the hospital was one of
fact for the jury.
[6] See Cal.Jur.2d, Negligence, § 307 et seq.; Am.Jur., Negligence (1st ed § 295 et seq).
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[10] New Trial-Insufliciency of Evidence-Discretion-Review.- \

The granting of a new trial for insufliciency of the evidence
is within the trial court's discretion .. It is only w?cre ~t can I
be said as a matter of law that there 1S no substanbaJ eVIdence
to support a different judgment that an appellate court will
,
reverse an order granting a new trial on such ground.

I

APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of Ala- \
meda County and from orders granting a new trial. Cecil \
Mosbacher, Judge. Judgments reversed; orders affirmed.
i
"

\

I

Action for damages for medical malpractice. Judgments
for defendants notwithstanding verdicts ·for plaintiffs, re- I
versed; alternative orders granting all defendants a new trial \
!
affirmed.
Jeremiah F. O'Neill, Jr., George W. Hauer and Robert A.
Kaiser for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Hardin, Fletcher, Cook & Bayes, Cyril Viadro, Peart,
Baraty & Hassard, George A. Smith, Joseph F. Rankin and
Richard G. Logan for Defendants and Respondents.
PETERS, J.-Plaintiffs appeal from judgments notwithstanding the verdicts, and from alternative orders granting all defendants a new trial. In our opinion the judgments notwithstanding the verdicts must be reversed, and
the orders granting a new trial must be affirmed.
The case revolves around the tragic experiences of plaintiff, Reginald Quintal (Reggie), who, in July of 1960, when
the events here involved occurred, was 6 years of age. Prior
to July 11, 1960, Reggie was a normal, healthy child, suffering only from an inward deviation of the eyes. On July 10,
1960, he entered the defendant hospital for the purpose of having this condition corrected by a minor operation to be performed on July 11, 1960, by defendant Dr. Palmberg. On
the morning of that day, during the course of the administration of the anesthetic by defendant Dr. Thornburg, Reggie
suffered a cardiac arrest. He was resuscitated by means
of an ope~chest heart massage. As a result of his brain being
deprived of oxygen during the period his heart was stopped,
he suffered severe brain damage resulting in his becoming a
spastic quadriplegic, blind" and mute. Reggie, through his
guardian ad litem, his mother, brought this action against
the two doctors and the hospital for malpractice. His mother
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sued for general and special damages. The jury returned
verdicts against all three defendants and in favor of Reggie
for $400,000, the precise amount prayed for in the complaint,
and in favor of the mother for her special damages of
$3,610.73. The trial court had denied motions for non suits
and for directed verdicts, but granted the motions of all of
the defendants for judgments notwithstanding the verdicts,
and in the alternative, awarded all defendants, by an appropriate written order, a new trial on the grounds of excessive
damages, insufficiency of the evidence, and that the verdicts
were against the law.
The facts are as follows: In 1960, Reggie was suffering
from some inward deviation of the eyes, but otherwise was
normal and healthy. On May 8, 1960, he was taken to
Laurel Grove Hospital in Castro Valley for an operation
aimed at correcting the eye condition. The operation was
performed by defendant Dr. Palmberg, an ophthalmologist,
and was completed without incident. The anesthesiologist
at that first operation is not a party to this case. He was an
associate of defendant Dr. Thornburg. The first operation
was not entirely successful in curing the deviation, and, after
conservative treatment failed to cure the condition, it was
decided that another operation was necessary. On July
10, 1960, Reggie was again taken to the Laurel Grove Hospital
for an operation scheduled for the next morning, and estimated to take 20 minutes. Dr. Palmberg was to do the eye
surgery, and Dr. Thornburg was to administer the anesthetic.
The evening Reggie entered the hospital he was crying, with
a running nose, was quite apprehensive, and was uncooperative. The medical record in fact shows that just before
surgery he was "very apprehensive" and "very agitated."
He had a temperature when he first arrived at the hospital,
which increased up to midnight. The hospital records purport to show that his temperature, just before the operation, was a little under normal, but by expert testimony it
was shown that there had been a correction and erasure in
that record, and what the original record showed does not
appear. The erasure was not explained by defendants. The
records also show that it was therein noted that the preoperative medication aimed at sedating the patient was
"unsatisfactory. "
When Dr. Palmberg entered the operating room Reggie
was already there, and Dr. Thornburg was administering the
anesthetic in a normal fashion. Dr. Palm berg took no
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part in administering the anesthetic, but remained in the
room some distance from the operating table talking to an
assistant about the intended operation.
During the administration of the anesthetic, and before
the process had been entirely completed, Reggie suffered a
respiratory arrest followed by a cardiac arrest. This means
that his breathing and heart stopped. This, of course, cut
off blood and oxygen to his brain. The record shows that
the brain, without damage, may be without oxygen for not
more than three minutes, but that every second over the
three-minute limit endangers the patient and makes brain
damage more probable.
When the respiratory and cardiac arrests occurred, Dr.
Thornburg called out that Reggie's heart had stopped beating. Dr. Palmberg and his as.o;istant rushed toward the
table. Dr. Thornburg let toe anesthetic gases out of the
anesthetic bag, filled the bag with pure oxygen, pumped
the bag with one hand and with the other attempted to
restore Reggie's heart action by external massage. This
process was continued for 20 or 30 seconds and was then
stopped to ascertain if the boy's heart had started. It had
not. The process was repeated for another 20 to 30 seconds,
but without success. Dr. Thornburg then asked Dr. Palmberg to open Reggie's chest in order to administer manual
massage to toe heart. Dr. Thornburg emphasized that this
operation had to be -done very quickly. Dr. Palmberg
stated that he did not feel qualified to perform such an
operation, and started to leave the operating room to get
help. Just near the door to the operating room he encountered Dr. Beumer, a surgeon. Dr. Beumer, at Dr. Palmberg's
request, entered the operating room, was quickly gloved,
and was handed a scalpel. He opened Reggie's chest and
began lleart massage. The heart responded almost immediately, and began once again to beat. The beat at first was uneven and it was twice necessary to use a defibrillator (an instrument that gives electric shocks to the heart) to correct
the defective heart action. .Although the evidence is confusing
and. somewhat in conflict, that most favorable to appellants
is that about four minutes elapsed between the time Dr.
Thornburg first noticed that the heart had stopped and the
time the heart was again started by means of the open heart
massage. Sometime after tIle operation it was dis('overed that
as a result of brain damage Reggie was a spastic quadriplegic
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and was both blind and mute. The condition appears to be
permanent.
The plaintiffs' counsel, on the question of the propriety
of the procedures employed, did not produce any independent expert witnesses, but relied on the cross-examination of
the two respondent doctors, called under the provisions of
section 2055 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and upon
the cross-examination of the defendants' expert witnesses. The
trial judge refused to instruct on the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur, but, after denying motions for nonsuits and directed
verdicts, submitted the case to the jury on the basic question
of whether the evidence showed that any or all of the
defendants were guilty of negligence proximately causing
the injuries. Proper instructions on the use of circumstantial evidence were given. The jury brought in the
verdicts above mentioned. The court thereafter granted
the motions of all of the defendants for judgments notwithstanding the verdicts, and in the alternative granted defendants' motion for a new trial.
The propriety of the jUdgments notwithstanding Ihe verdicts.
These must be considered, of course, as to each defendant
separately, although many of the facts are pertinent to two
or more of the defendants.
[1] The rules applicable to judgments notwithstanding
the verdict for defendant are well settled and are agreed
to by all the parties. Such a motion may be granted, properly, only when, disregarding the conflicting evidence, and
indulging in every legitimate inference in favor of the
plaintiff, the result is a determination that there is no evidence of substantial nature to support the verdict. [2] The
trial court, on such motion, is not permitted to weigh the
evidence, and on an appeal from the judgment entered on
the granting of such a motion, the appellate court must read
the record in the light most advantageous to the plaintiff,
resolve all conflicts in his favor, and give him the benefit of
all reasonable inferences in support of the judgment.
The propriety of the judgments notwithstanding as 10 Dr.
Palm berg and Dr. Thornburg.
[3] Both of these defendants are highly qualified and
competent specialists. Dr. Thornburg is an American board
certified anesthesiologist, and Dr. Palmberg is an American
board certified ophthalmologist. They are, of course, held
to that standard of learning and skill normally possessed
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by such specialists in the same or similar locality under 'the;,
same or similar circumstances. The question involved is~
whether there is any evidence in the record to show, or;;1
from which it may reasonably be inferred, that either doctor, ~~
or both, failed to meet the standard involved. In our opinion f1
the evidence, independently of any possible application of I
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, is sufficient to support
verdict against the two d o c t o r s . ;
[4] There was evidence that Reggie's cardiac arrest was 1
caused by "vagal stimulation," that is stimulation of the !
vagus nerve, a basic nerve involved in the beating of the heart.
Cardiac arrest is a known and calculated risk in the giving I'
of a general anesthetic. The statistics produced as to its i
frequency are highly conflicting. Certainly it can be said
that it occurs rarely but constantly. It can be caused by
negligence. Thus it can be caused by an improper mixture
of the anesthetic, by careless intubation, by giving the anesthetic while the patient has some infection, by an improper
mixture of oxygen during anesthesia and by several other
causes. It can also result where there is no negligence on
the part of the doctors. Thus, it can result from cardiac
disease, from unknown and hidden idiosyncrasies of the
body, from an upset in the electrolyte balance of the body,
and from other unknown causes. In the present case although the cause-vagal stimulation-was known, the cause
of such stimulation was unknown. No expert testified,
directly, as to the cause of the cardiac arrest suffered by
Reggie.
While there was no direct testimony that the most likely
cause of the vagal stimulation was negligence, there was
evidence to the effect that if due care is used a cardiac arrest
does not ordinarily, but can, occur. Defendants testified
that several of the unknown causes were not here present,
but their credibility in this respect was for the jury. Dr.
Cullen, president of the American Board of Anesthesiology
and chairman of the Department of Anesthesiology of the
University of California, opined that 90 per cent of the
deaths occurring in patients under anesthesia were due to
improper management of. the airway. The hospital reports,
available to both doctors, showed, without explanation, that
the preoperative medication used in May had been more than
doubled in July; that when the boy arrived at the hospital
he was apprehensive, uncooperative, crying and agitated.
The records disclosed that on the morning of the operation
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the boy was "very apprehensive" and ., very agitated" and
that the preoperative medication had been "Wlsatisfactory."
The records also show that after his admission to the hospital
on the 10th he had a rising temperature Wltil at least midnight. The r~cords also purport to show that the next morning the temperature was below normal, but there is expert
testimony that this record had been altered, and it may be
that the erased record showed a rising temperature. Both
apprehension and the rising temperature are danger signals.
Dr. Thornburg testified that any rise in temperature would
cause the doctor to investigate; that fever is usually an indication of infection that might stimulate the vagus nerve; that
~~ a rise in temperature was caused by an infection the
patient should not be submitted to anesthesia until the
symptoms had been alleviated, preferably for about 72 hours.
In that connection it must be remembered that this was an
elective and not an emergency surgery, in that there was
110 medical necessity for it to be performed at any particular
time. Apprehension is also an important factor. Apprehension is an emotional state or reaction, and causes adrenaline to be pumped into the circulatory system. This increases
the sensitivity of the heart. This can cause a reaction to
the vagus nerve in that it can cause an increase in blood
pressure and an increase in the pulse rate. Thus, in the
present case we have fever, and we have apprehension. Either
were danger signals. It is trlle that the doctors involved
testified that they considered such factors and for various
reasons found them not convincing, but the veracity of such
testimony from interested witnesses was for the jury.
All of these factors apply to both doctors, both of whom
knew the facts, had access to the records, and either could
have called off the operation if he believed it would be
dangerous.
There is another important factor relating to negligence
on the part of Dr. Palmbcrg. It will be remembered that
when Dr. Thornburg asked him to open the boy's chest, emphasizing that time was essential, he stated that he did not
feel compet~nt to do so and sought someone that was. He
ruslled to the door of the operating room and found Dr.
Beumer. Dr. Beumer came into the room, was gloved, was
llanded a scalpcl, and then opened Reggie's chest. Although
a surgeon, he had never before performed such an operation.
There was much relevant testimony on the problems presented by this evidence. Various experts stated that car&Z C.2d-l

162

QUINTAL tJ.

LAUREL

GROVE HOSPITAL

Wac arrest was a known risk in all general anesthesia cases,'
and Dr. Palmberg admitted that he knew that this was
so. Open chest surgery, in 1960, was the normal way of
handling such a problem, if external massage was not successful. Dr. Palmberg knew that this was so. The medical
profession, generally, was quite concerned about this problem.
In Alameda County, the medical association furnished lecturers, movies and demonstrations on this problem and how
it should be handled, not only to the members of the general
association, but to the specialist groups such as the ophthalmologists. Plaques, with directions as to how to handle the
emergency, were placed in each operating room in the county.
Dr. Palmberg admitted knowing that time was of the essence
in such cases, and that every second over three minutes that
the brain was deprived of oxygen increased the danger of
permanent brain damage. Although the times involved in
the instant case cannot be determined with precision, there
is substantial evidence that Reggie's heart was stopped for
four !ninutes before Dr. Beumer was successful in starting
it. Just how many seconds were consumed after Dr. Palmberg
announced that he did not feel competent to perform the
operation, then rushed to the door, found Dr. Beumer, brought
him into the operating room, had him gloved, and handed
a scalpel so the operation could proceed, does not accurately
appear in the record. It is a reasonable inference that
most of a minute was so consumed, certainly at least 30 to
45 seconds. These were the dangerous seconds. It can be
inferred that they were the brain damaging seconds.
Under such facts, two questions immediately arise. Would
reasonable prudence have required that Dr. Palmberg, although an ophthalmologist, a surgeon, but a specialist, possess
the skill to perform such a relatively simple operation' He
was required to take and did take general surgery courses
in medical school. If Dr. Palmberg did not possess such
skill, does not reasonable care require that such a surgeon
see to it that a competent surgeon is immediately in attendance to meet this emergency if it should ariseT Because
of th~ known time limits involved, by "immediately" available is meant not in the hospital, but in the operating room
itself. These are difficult questions. It is arguable that
the standard of due Care involved in this respect does hot
require expert evidence, that is, that the required standard
of care is so clear that it is a matter that the jury could decide
without expert evidence. However, it is unnecessary to rely

,
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on common knowledge in this case because there is expert
testimony from which the jury could infer that the proper
standard of due care required Dr. Palmberg to perform the
operation, or if not, to have had someone immediately available who could perform it.
lt is true that thcre is expert evidence from the defendants
and from their witnesses that the standard of care then
prevalent in Alameda County did not require that an ophthalmologist be competent to perform a thoracotomy. But
there is other expert evidence from these very same witnesses
that would support an inference to the contrary. All thc
witnesses admitted that the possibility of a cardiac arrest
was a known risk. All admitted that the operating surgeon,
regardless of his sepecialty, should be prepared in some way.
Dr. Dugan, a thoracic surgeon, although he testified he did
not believe an ordinary ophthalmologist was qualified to
open a chest, and that if he were the patient he would take
the fellow in the hall, even if to get him consumed 30 seconds.
rather than have an unqualified man open his chest, admitt~d
on cross-examination that "Anybody, any surgeon who is
operating in a hospital, I will admit and agree, in dire
circumstances should be able to do an open chest operation."
Certainly, the circumstances here involved were "dire,"
and every second was precious. The fact that Dr. Beumer
was available as quickly as he was was a coincidence and
not a planned procedure. Thus the jury could have inferred
from the testimony that either Dr. Palmberg should have
performed the thoracotomy, or should have taken steps to
llave someone present to do so.
Thus the evidence, while circumstantial, was sufficient to
go to the jury on the question of the two doctors' negligence.
This is so without any reference to .or reliance upon the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Independently of that doctrine, there is evidence sufficient to permit the jury to infer
negligence on the part of the doctors. But because a new
trial is required, something should be said about whether
the jury on such new trial should be instructed on thc
doctrine. Weare of the opinion that it should.
It is somewhat difficult to separate the so-called conditional
res ipsa doctrine from inferences predicated on circumstantial
evidence, because res ipsa in such a case is, of course, a
doctrine fundamentally predicated on circumstantial evidence, and the weigllt that sllOuld be given to it.
[5] Thc facts of the present case present a clear situa-
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tion where the conditional doctrine of res ipsa applies. Ifl
the jury finds certain facts, which they are entitled' to find
from the evidence, then the doctrine applies. Here we have
an injury which is very rare. It is an injury that could
result from negligence, or could result without negligence.
Is it more probable than not that it was the result of negligence T That is the question. The plaintiffs, out of the mouths
of defendants and their witnesses, proved that the injury
could occur as a result of negligence. There is also evidence
that the injury could occur without negligence. In such
circumstances the jury should be instructed that if they
find certain facts to be true they should apply the inference involved in res ipsa. Here we have an injury that is
a known risk and rarely occurs. 'Ve have the instrumentality
and the procedures involved completely in the control of
defendant doctors. \Ve have tlle boy under an anesthetic.
Certainly the facts called for an explanation. The defendant.'> explained what they did and testified that this was due
care. But there was testimony that 90 per cent of the deaths
resulting from cardiac arrest occurred by reason of faulty
intubation. There was testimony that would justify the
jury in inferring that if the operation had been performed
within three minutes of the heart stoppage brain damage
would not have resulted. We have evidence that temperature
and apprehension increase the risk. We have the evidence
of the erasures on the temperature chart. Under these
circumstances the jury could find that it is more probable
than not that the injury was the result of negligence. That
is the test.
[6] As stated in Fowler v. Seaton, 61 Ca1.2d 681, 686
[39 Ca1.Rptr. 881, 394 P.2d 697] :
"It is our opinion that the jury could find that the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur applies under the facts here involved.
Generally, that doctrine applies 'where the accident is of
such a nature that it can be said, in the light of past experience, that it probably was the result of negligence by someone
and that the defendant. is probably the person who is responsible.' (Siv.crson v. W cber, 57 Ca1.2d 834, 836 [22 Ca1.Rptr.
337,372 P.2d 97] ; accord Faulk v. Sobcf'OlIcs, 56 Ca1.2d 466,
470 [14 Cal.Rptr. 545, 363 P.2d 593]; Zentz v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co., 39 Ca1.2d 436, 446 [247 P.2d 344].) . . .
"One of the frequently quoted statement,> of tIle applicabh'
rules is to be found in the opinion of Chief Justice Erlf' in
Scott v. London &'; St. Kllthc1'inc Docks Co. (1865) 3 II. & C.
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596, quoted in Prosser on 'I'ort... (2d ed. 1955) section 42, at
page 201, as follows: 'There must be reasonable evidence of
negligence; but where the thing is shown to be under the
management of the defendant or his servants, and the accident
is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen
if those who have the management use proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the
defendants, that the accident arose from want of care.'
[7] "Of course, negligence and connecting defendant
with it, like other facts, can be proved by circumstantial evidence. There does not have to be an eyewitness, nor need
there be direct evidence of defendant's conduct. There
is no absolute requirement that the plaintiff explain how
the accident happened. [8] Res ipsa loquitur may apply
where the cause of the injury is a mystery, if there is a
reasonable and logical inference that defendant was negligent,
and that such negligence caused the injury. (Prosser on
Torts, supra at p. 204.) "
It is true that in Siverson v. Weber, 57 Ca1.2d 834, 836 [22
Cal.Rptr. 337, 372 P.2d 97], the court affirmed a nonsuit in
favor of a surgeon where the medical experts all testified that
they could not determine the cause of the fistula there involved, and that fistulas do occur although due care is used.
There is similar testimony here. The court in Siverson, supra,
listed the usual causes of such injury and then stated
(p.838):
"There is nothing to indicate that if the fistula was caused
by any of the factors listed above or any combination of
them the injury sustained by the plaintiff was a result of
negligence." And again at page 839: "No medical witness
testified that in the rare cases where fistulas occur they
are more probably than not the result of negligence." The
court emphasized that the fact a particular injury is a rare
occurrence does not in itself prove that the injury was
probably caused by negligence.
Each case, of course, must be determined on its own facts.
Here the facts> are somewhat similar to those in Davis v.
Memorial Hospital, 58 Cal.2d 815 [26 Cal.Rptr. 633, 376
P.2d 561J. There a rectal absc~ occurred after an enema.
There was medical evidence that 90 per cent of all such
abscesses result from bacterial infection, that a mucous membrane normally prevents such infection, and that in the
medical expert's opinion the insertion of the enema tube
caused the break. There was other expert testimony that
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the abscess was not<'fJo'i~usedKand.probably resulted from
other causes. After referring to the rule stated in Siverson
v. llT eber, supra, 57 Cal.2d 834, 836, above quoted, the court
in Davis stated (p. 817) : "Where the evidence is conflicting
or subject to different inferences as to a fact necessary to the
applicability of the doctrine, for example, as to whether
an accident claimed by the plaintiff happened or whether
an injury was caused by the conduct of the defendant rather
than by the acts of someone else, the question of fact must be
left to the jury under proper instructions. [Citations.] "
The court held that res ipsa instructions on a conditional
basis should have been given.
The evidence in the present case, although not as strong
as in Davis, is nevertheless sufficient to warrant conditional
instructions on res ipsa. Dr. Cullen did testify that 90 per
cent of the deaths occurring in patients under anesthesia
from cardiac arrests were due to improper management of
the airway. There was also testimony that exposure of an
improperly premedicated patient to anesthesia not infrequently precipitates responses which endanger the life of
the patient; that agitation and apprehension of the patient
are danger signals; that the temperature of the patient is
important, and normally, in an elective operation, anesthesia
should not be given for 72 hours after the temperature becomes normal; and that failing to keep the tissues adequately
oxygenated is' the forerunner of many anesthetic complications. All of these, obviously, could involve negligence. It
was for the jury to say whether it was more probable than
not that any of them did. Thus, on the new trial, the jury
should be instructed on this doctrine.
Liability of the hospital.
[9] It has heretofore been demonstrated that the jury
was justified in finding that Dr. Thornburg and Dr. Palmberg were negligent. That does not, of course, automatically,
in the absence of an agency, impose liability on the hospital.
But there was evidence from which an agency could be
inferred. Dr. Thornburg testified that he had an active part
in the management of the hospital. He was its acting administrator and a member of its board of directors. As acting
administrator he came to an a"ooreement with the group of
anesthesiologists with whom' he was connected to furnish a
proper anesthesiologist upon demand of the hospital. Thereafter, as administrator, he presented the proposed plan to
the directors, and as a member of the board, voted for it.
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He conceded that either the anesthesiologists or the hospital
could terminate the agreement at any time. Under this oral
agreement the hospital got in touch with the group of anesthesiologists, and the group sent to the hospital the available
doctor on the list. The hospital, of course, furnished the
nurses who attended Reggie, and the operating room nurses.
It also furnished all equipment used by the anesthesiologist,
including the anesthetic.
.
When the mother of Reggie brought him to the hospital on
July 10, 1960, she was required by the hospital officials to
sign an ,. A uthority to Operate," authorizing the physician
in charge of Reggie "to administer such treatment and the
surgeon to have administered such anesthetics as found necessary and to perform the" eye operation. This document was
not only secured by hospital employees, but was witnessed
by two employees of the hospital.
This evidence presented a question of fact to the jury.
The factual situation is somewhat similar to that presented
in Seneris v. Haas, 45 Ca1.2d 811 [291 P.2d. 915, 53 A.L.R.
2d 124], where the hospital was held liable for the negligence
of an anesthesiologist. There, as here, the anesthesiologist was
a member of the hospital staff, there, as here, the anesthesiologists used in the hospital were approved and appointed
by the board of directors upon recommendation of the medical
staff; the anesthesiologists there, as here, were on call by the
hospital; there, as here, the anesthesiologist billed the patient;
there, as here, all medications, white clothing, and nursing
services, etc., were furnished by the hospital. There, unlike
here, the anesthesiologist had no separate office, but took his
calls from the hospital at his home. The court held that such
a factual situation presented a question of fact as to whether
an agency existed. The court stated (p. 831): "Unless the
evidence is susceptible of but a single inference, the question
of agency is one of fact for the jury [citation]. We said in
Rice v. Oalifornia Ltlfheran HospitaZ, 27 Ca1.2d 296, 304 [163
P.2d 860], that 'It should be noted that a nurse or physician
may be the servant of a hospital, thus requiring the application of the doctrine of respondeat superior even though they
are performing professiol1al acts. [Citations.]'
"In Stanhope v. Los Angeles Oollege of Ohiropractic, 54
Cal.App.2d 141, 146 [128 P.2d 705], the court said: '''An
agency is ostensible when the principal intentionally or by
want of ordinary care, causes a third person to believe another to be his agent who is not really employed by him."

(Civ. Code, § 2300.) In this connection it is urged by appellant that "before a recovery can be had against a principal
for the alleged acts of an ostensible agent, three things must
be proved, to-wit:" (quoting from H",ll v. Citizens Nat. Trust
& Sa'/). Bank, 9 Cal.2d 172, 176 [69 P.2d 853]) "[First] The
person dealing with the agent must do so with belief in the
agent's authority and this belief must be a reasonable one;
[second] such belief must be generated by some act or neglect of the principal sought to be charged; [third] and the
third person in relying on the agent's apparent authority
must not be guilty of negligence. (1 Cal.Jur. 739; Weintraub
v. Weingart, 98 Cal.App. 690 [277 P. 752].)"
" 'An examination of the evidence hereinbefore referred to
which was produced on the issue of agency convinces us that
respondent has met the requirements enumerated in the Hill
case. So far as the record reveals appellant did nothing to
put respondent on notice that the X-ray laboratory was not
an integral part of appellant institution, and it cannot seriously be contended that respondent, when he was being carried from room to room suffering excruciating pain, should
have inquired whether the individual doctors who examined
him were employees of the college or were independent contractors. Agency is always a question of fact for the jury.' "
Under the theory of the Seneris case and of the cases referred to therein (see also Smith v. Fall River Joint Unum
High School Dist., 118 Cal.App. 673, 681 [5 P.2d 930];
Messner v. Board of Dental Examiners, 87 Cal.App. 199,
204 [262 P. 58]; Riskin v. Industrial Acc. Com., 23 Cal.2d
248 [144 P.2d 16]) the agency question was one of fact.
For all of the foregoing reasons the judgments notwithstanding the verdicts as to all three defendants must be
reversed.
The orders granting new triaZs.
[10] Obviously, the new trial orders must be affirmed.
One of the grounds specified in the written orders was insufficiency of the evidence. The granting of a new trial on this
gr~und is, of course, within the discretion of the trial court.
(Yarrow v. State of California, 53 Cal.2d 427 [2 Cal.Rptr.
137, 348 P.2d 687]; Estate of Masrobian, 207 CaLApp.2d
133 [24 Cal.Rptr. 263].) It is only where it can be said as
a matter of law that there is no substantial evidence to support
a different judgment that an appellate court will reverse an
order granting a new trial on insufficiency. This is not such
a case. As already pointRd out many of the conclusions that
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. suppori'~i{aings1'oi negligence by th~'doctOJ'J;est on inferences. ,The trial judge, contrary to the jury, was entitled
not to make such inferences. Thus the new trial orders must
be affirmed.
The judgments notwitbstanding the verdicts as to all three
defendants are reversed, and the orders granting all three
defendants a new trial are affirmed, each side to bear its own
costs on this appeal.
Tobriner, J., and Peek, J., concurred.
MOSK, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-The trial judge
in granting the motion for a new trial concluded the evidence
was insufficient to establish negligence. Under well settled
law we must ordinarily assume this is so, but here the trial
court erroneously failed to consider this a conditional res
ipsa. loquitur case, as the majority opinion so persuasively
demonstrates it to be. (Davis v. Memorial Hospital (1962)
58 Cal.2d 815 [26 Cal.Rptr. 633, 376 P.2d 561].) The rule
under these circumstances is that a "defendant will not be
held blameless except upon a showing either (1) of a satisfactory explanation of the accident, that is, an affirmative
showing of a definite cause for the accident, in which cause
no element of negligence on the part of the defendant inheres,
or (2) of such care in all possible respects as necessarily to
lead to the conclusion that the accident could not have happened from want of care, but must have been due to some
unpreventable cause, although the exact cause is unknown.
In the latter case, inasmuch as the process of reasoning is
one of exclusion, the care shown must be satisfactory in the
sense that it covers all causes which due care on the part of
the defendant might have prevented." (Dierman v. Providence Hospital (1947) 31 Ca1.2d 290, 295 [188 P.2d 12];
RoddisCf'aft, Inc.v. Skelton Logging 00. (1963) 212 Cal.
App.2d 784 [28 Cal.Rptr. 277]; McDonald v. Foster Memorial
Hospital (1959) 170 Cal.App.2d 85, 102 [338 P.2d 607];
Bischoff v. Newby's Tire Service (1958) 166 Cal.App.2d 563,
569 [333 P.2d 44] ; Oldis v. La Societe Francaise (1955) 130
CalApp.2d 461, 469 [279 P.2d 184]; Talbert v. Ostergaard
(1954) 129 CalApp.2d 222, 228 [276 P.2d 880].) If the res
ipsa loquitur inference had been invoked herein, I would find
that the defendants failed to 'overcome it by adequate affirmative evidence, and the trial court would not, or should not,
have granted the motion for a new trial on the ground of
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insufficiency of the evidence. (Gerhardt v. Fresno Medical
Group (1963) 217 Cal.~PP.2d. 8.58,.~6.1131 Ca~.Rptr.633~.t.J,(
To approve the grantlDg of 'thism()tion;penalizes the plalD-";i~
tiff who offered a proper res ipsa loquitur instruction, favors :
the defendants who erroneously opposed the res ipsa theory !
and instruction, and affirms the trial court which the majority
opinion finds was in error. This is a result in which I cannot
acquiesce.
The majority opinion does not discuss the question of
excessive damages as a ground for new trial. Defendants
here concede the injuries were both severe and permanent
but attempt to support the claim that damages were excessive on the theory that "common knowledge would seem to
dictate that the life expectancy of a child 6 years old in
plaintiff's condition could not be long." No authority is
cited to justify bringing that medical subject under the ,
umbrella of common knowledge.
I concur in reversing the judgments notwithstanding the
verdicts. I would reverse the order granting defendants
a new trial.
TRAYNOR, C. J.-I concur in the judgment.
Since there is substantial evidence to support a verdict for
plaintiffs, I agree that the judgments notwithstanding the
verdict must be reversed. I likewise agree that the orders
granting a new trial must be affirmed because there is substantial evidence to support a verdict for defendants. I
cannot agree, however, that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
is applicable or that verdicts could be sustained on certain
other theories of negligence invoked by the majority opinion.
"As a general rule, res ipsa loquitur applies where the
accident is of such a nature that it can be said, in the light
of past experience, that it probably was the result of negligence by someone and that the defendant is probably the
person who is responsible. . .. In determining whether such
probabilities exist with regard to a particular occurrence, the
courts have relied on both common knowledge and the testimony of expert witneSses." (Siverson v. Weber, 57 Ca1.2d
834, 836 [22 Cal.Rptr. 337, 372 P.2d 97].)
Since the possible causes of cardiac arrests are not a matter
of cOJpmon knowledge (cf. Davis v. Memorial Hospital, 58
Cal.2d 815, 817 {26 Ca1.Rptr. 633, 376 P.2d 561]), expert
testimony is required before a conditional res ipsa loquitur
instruction would be proper. Expert testimony that it is more
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probable than not tllat negligence is the cause of cardiac
arrests, if believed, would permit tlte jury to draw an inference of negligence solely from the fact that the arrest occurred. In deciding whether an instruction on the doctrine
should be given, it is therefore irrelevant that there may be
facts other than the occurrence itself to suggest that the
arrest was caused by negligence. Although such facts, if
present, might be independent proof of negligence, they have
no bearing on the question whether the jury should be permitted to draw an inference of negligence on the happening
of the cardiac arrest alone. Hence reliance on evidence that
the defendants may have failed properly to appreciate plaintiff's apprehension and temperature is misplaced. The only
question relevant to determining whether a res ipsa loquitur
instruction should be given is: Has evidence been offered by
expert testimony that when cardiac arrests occur, they arc
more probably than not caused by negligence T
No such expert testimony appears. Plaintiffs rely on
testimony of both defendant doctors that, when due care
is used, cardiac arrests do not ordinarily occur. This testimony, however, fails to establish anything with respect to the
question whether, among the possible causes, negligence is
the more probable one when these arrests do occur. It is
true that cardiac arrests do not ordinarily occur when due
care is used because, as all the testimony makes clear, a
cardiac arrest is a rare occurrence. As stated in Siverson v.
Weber, supra, 57 Cal.2d 834, 839, however, "The fact that
a particular injury suffered by a patient as the result of an
operation is something that rarely occurs does not in itself
prove that the injury was probably caused by the negligence
of those in charge of the operation." The record shows that
plaintiffs' counsel was fully aware of this holding in the
Siverson case. He could easily have framed his questions
to elicit testimony as to the probability of negligence when
cardiac arrests occur, but he did not do so.
Plaintiffs also rely on expert testimony "that 90 percent
of the deaths occurring in patients under anesthesia are due
to imprqper management of the airway." This testimony,
however, cannot reasonably be interpreted to mean that when
cardiac arrests occur, it is more probable than not that they
are caused by negligence. 'Thus, this percentage covers deaths
otller than those following cardiac arrests. The expert who
offered this estimate testified that deaths may occur under
anesthesia from disturbances that are at least as likely to
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happen as cardiac arrests. He did not testify that 90 percent
of cardiac arrests were caused by improper management of
the airway. Moreover, his testimony makes clear that by
"improper management" he did not mean faulty or negligent
management. He defined "improper management" as any
failure "to maintain the free movement of air." Although
he admitted that such failures could be prevented in many
instances by an anesthesiologist exercising due care, he denied
that mismanagement by the anesthesiologist is necessarily involved, and could not say that it is probably the cause when
cardiac arrests occur.l
Defendant anesthesiologist testified that the most common
cause of cardiac arrest is direct or indirect stimulation of
the vagus nerve. He added that in his opinion such stimulation was the cause of this cardiac arrest. He testified furtller
that there were several stimuli that might have been operative. This testimony, however, sheds no light on whether
negligence is more probably than not the cause of bringing
any of these stimuli into play. Moreover, the record presents
abundant uncontradicted evidence that the medical profession is in doubt as to the causes that ultimately bring about
the physiological events leading to cardiac arrest. In view
of such evidence, the most that can reasonably be concluded
from the medical testimony with respect to the probabilities
of negligence as a cause of cardiac arrest is that negligence
will increase the risk of its occurrence. There is no expert
testimony that when it does occur, negligence is more probably than not the cause. Accordingly, plaintiffs are not
entitled to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
The question remains whether there is any evidence that
defendants failed to possess and exercise that reasonable
degree of skill, knowledge, and care ordinarily possessed and
exercised by members of their profession under similar circumstances. (Sinz v. Owens, 33 Ca1.2d 749, 753 [205 P.2d
3, 8 A.L.R.2d 757].)
There is no evidence that defendant doctors were negligent
in making the initial decision to operate. Although the child
IThe testimony in question is as follows:
"Q. What do you mean by improper management of the airway'
A. It has not been managed to' maintain the free movement of air."
"Q. That is due to the anesthesiologist's mismanagement! A. No,
t.hat doesn't mean that, necessarily. It means that sometimes it is impossible to do this."
"Q. In most instances it is pr('Yental)le in the exercise of due care by
the anestllesiologist, isn't it, Doctor' A. In many instances it is."
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was "'very apprehensive" and "very agitated" on the morning of the operation, undisputed medical testimony rejected
the view that this condition contraindicated surgery. The
hospital records show that preoperative medication,2 adminiRtt'red in part to allay the patient's apprehension, was "unsatisfactory." Defendant anesthesiologist testified that "unsatisfactory" did not mean "not sedated to the extent he
should be:" It meant only not "sedated to the extent I
should like to have [him] sedated." The testimony of the
Chairman of the Department of Anesthesiology of the University of California at San Francisco confirmed that many
children are ,. very apprehensive"8 just prior to an operation and that an attempt to reduce this apprehension by
further sedation might dangerously depress circulation and
respiration. This expert also testified that he would have
administered anesthesia .. under those circumstances" and
that standard practice did not require the anesthesiologist
to postpone it. Plaintiffs introduced no other testimony that
would permit a jury to evaluate the significance of "very
apprehensive," "very agitated," and "unsatisfactory" in a
medical context. Hence, even if the jury did not believe
the explanations offered, plaintiffs would not have met their
burden of proof.
The record of the child's temperature adds no more. The
temperature had risen to 100.6 on the eve of surgery. Defendant ophthalmologist investigated the fever and found that
the rise was not due to any infection that would increase
the risk of complications under anesthesia. Plaintiffs offered
no evidence to the contrary. The hospital chart shows that
the child's temperature was below normal on the morning of
surgery. Medical experts testified that such a sequence of
events would not contraindicate surgery. Although a hand2Defendant anesthesiologist offered undisputed testimony that nembutal was administered to allay apprehension; atropine, to depress
reflexes and decrease secretions. Although the dosage of atropine was
twi<'e that given at the flrst operation, there is no evidence connecting
that increase with the possible causes of cardiac arrest. On the contrary.
ilef('ndant anesthesiologist testified that atropine is used specifically to
.lecrease the 8cnsit.h·ity of the vagus nerve t.o reflexes that may occur
.luring anesthesia. Moreover, expert testimony is uncontradicted that tile
('hild was prep~red for the operation according to standard procedures.
8Neither party ask('d this expert any qUe8tions about the significance
of ,. very agitated." Defendant n:!Iest.hesiologist, who used this term in
llis post·opernth·e report, testified' that be usl'd it as a synonym for
"very IIppr('hensive." He also testified that he used "very apprehensive" to summarize the faet that the child was crying and uncooperative.
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writing expert testified that a relevant part of the tempera-!
ture chart showed signs of an erasure, he also testified that <1
there "was no indication under the microscope of what had !
been erased nor precisely where it was." Moreover, on crossexamination he •• oouldn 't positively say" that there had been
any writing beneath the erasure. No jury could reasonably
make a finding of negligence on the basis of such testimony.
There is also no evidence that defendant ophthalmologist
was under a duty either to possess the skill to perform a
thoracotomy in the event of a cardiae arrest, or to see to it
that a competent surgeon was in the operating room at all
times. Every medical witness testified that it was standard
practice to call in a thoracic or general surgeon in the event
of cardiac arrest. No medical witness testified that it was
standard practice for an ophthalmologist to possess such skill.
It is true that one surgeon, who otherwise agreed with these
conclusions, said on cross-examination, Ie Anybody, any surgeon who is operating in a hospital, ... in dire circumstances
should be able to do an open chest operation. " Yet he added,
"However, if he has any choice whatsoever and he has never
done this, and he has anyone better qualified in the immediate
vicinity he is well advised to have them do it." The rest of
this surgeon's testimony indicates that by "immediate vicinity" he did not mean that a competent surgeon ought always
to be present in the operating room itself. Moreover, this
expert testified that he had been active in the local campaign
designed to alert all specialists to the possibility of cardiac
arrest and to inform them about the procedure of thoracotomy.
Yet he testified that despite this campaign most specialists
could not be expected to perform the operation. Hence his
statement that any operating surgeon should be able to open
a chest can reasonably be interpreted only as an expression
of an ideal that had not yet become a standard of care. Hence
no jury could reasonably conclude that defendant ophthalmologist failed to meet the standard of care by not performing
the thoracotomy himself or not insuring the presence of a
competent surgeon in the operating room at all times.
There is evidence, howe,'er, that defendants were negligent
in failing to make reasonable preparation for the possible
occu'rrence of a cardiac arrest. (See Harper and James, The
Law of Torts (195{j) § 16.11, p. 939; Prosser on Torts (3d
ed. 1964) pp. 173, 343-344.) Both defendant doctors knew
that cardiac arrest was 8n inherent risk of surgery under
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anesthesia. Both testified that when an arrest occurs every
second counts. Both doctors had good reason to believe that
a general surgeon would be readily available in the area surrounding the operating room. It may be inferred, however,
that they did not confer before the operation to plan an
efficient procedure for summoning such a surgeon in response
to a possible emergency. Thus, defendant ophthalmologist
testified that he could not remember any conversation with
the anesthesiologist, although "frequently we have a conversation about the operation prior to surgery. " Moreover,
defendant anesthesiologist was apparently unaware of the
inability of defendant ophthalmologist to perform a thoracotomy, for when tIle arrest occurred he did not immediately
send for a general surgeon. Instead, after it became apparent that external massage had failed, precious time elapsed
while the ophthalmologist came to the table, revealed his
inability to open the chest, and went to the door to get the
general surgeon. More time passed while the general surgeon
entered the room and put on gloves before making the
incision. Althougll the record does not specify how much
time these steps entailed, a jury could reasonably conclude
from defendant ophthalmologist's testimony that the additional loss of time was enough to cause the brain damage.
This time might have been saved had preparations been made
for summoning the general surgeon as soon as a cardiac arrest
was suspected, so that he could be ready to open the chest
at the moment it became apparent that external massage
had failed.
Although there is no expert testimony that the prevailing
medical standard of care requires such preparation for a
possible cardiac arrest, expert testimony is not required when
scientific enlightenment is not necessary to show that failure
to malte such preparations is unreasonable. (Ales v. Ryan,
8 Cal.2d 82, 100 [64 P.2d 409] ; Barham v. Widing, 210 Cal.
206, 214 [291 P. 173J; see Lawless v. Calaway, 24 Ca1.2d 81,
86 [147 P.2d 604] ; B!'uce v. United States, 167 F.Supp. 579,
583; Prosser on Torts (3d ed. 1964) p.167.) On that basis
alone, I would reverse the judgments notwithstanding the
verdicts.
McCOMB, J.-I dissent. I would affirm the judgment in
favor of d~endants for the reasons expressed by Mr. Justice
Salsman in the opinion prepared by him for the District
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Court of Appeal in Quintal v. Laurel Grove Hospital (Cal.
App.) 38 Cal.Rptr. 749.
Schauer, J.,. concurred.
Respondents' petitions for a rehearing were denied January
13, 1965. Traynor, C. J., and McComb, J., were of the
opinion that the petitions should be granted.

